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Abstract 
This study explores the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt accumulation 
under fixed, managed, and floating regimes. We estimate dynamic panel data models for 97 
countries from 1993 to 2016. Our empirical findings show that commodity price volatility 
increases external debt accumulation for commodity-exporting countries. This impact is three-
times higher for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes compared to managed floating 
exchange rate regimes. Under floating exchange regimes, the effect of commodity price 
volatility on external debt is statistically insignificant. Our results suggest that the adoption of 
a floating exchange rate regime by commodity-exporting countries is critical to mitigate the 
effects of commodity price volatility on external debt accumulation.  
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The global financial crisis (GFC) and the present Covid-19 pandemic have forced many 
governments to stimulate the economy by increasing fiscal deficits. Consequently, external 
debt as a percentage of GDP has significantly increased for many countries in the last decade. 
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Recent data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that for emerging markets and 
developing economies, general government gross debt as a percentage of GDP increased from  
77.9% in 2008 to 124.1% in 2020, while for advanced economies, it increased from 38.6% to 
61.4% for the same two periods. This observation is particularly important for commodity-
abundant economies. In this study, we explore the impact of commodity price volatility on 
external debt for 97 countries in a panel dataset for the period 1993 to 2016. Further, we 
examine the role of alternative exchange rate regimes in influencing the impact of commodity 
price volatility on external debt accumulation for both commodity-exporters and commodity-
importers. 
Commodity price shocks can create a dilemma for countries, if fiscal revenue largely 
depends on commodities. The risk being that revenue boosted by high commodity prices in 
good times translate into long-lasting expenditure increasing external debt. For example, 
Algeria, Nigeria, and Venezuela fell prey to over-optimistic spending habits during the 1970s 
commodity price booms.  These countries use current and expected revenues to finance 
different development projects (Brown, Crawford and Gibson 2008). Such projects became 
unsustainable when commodity prices declined, and volatility increased during the GFC and 
the Covid-19 pandemic. As the fiscal deficit rises, governments borrow money from 
international financial markets, which increases the country’s debt levels (Brown and Gibson 
2006). In general, borrowing money helps to increase economic growth by reducing the gap 
between domestic saving and investment. However, external debt sustainability may 
deteriorate if the debt to GDP ratio becomes too large. Consequently, governments face a 
decreased capacity to make debt repayments, and the probability of defaulting increases 
(Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci 2002). 
Commodity prices are by nature more volatile than the prices of manufactured goods 
[see e.g., Dossani and Elder (2020) Radetzki and Wårell (2016), Jacks, O’Rourke and 
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Williamson (2011) and Szirmai (2005)], making export revenue highly volatile, especially for 
commodity-exporting countries. 1  In this study, we select commodity-exporting countries 
following Cavalcanti, Mohaddes, and Raissi (2012), who classified countries as commodity 
exporters if the primary commodity constitutes more than 50 per cent of the country’s total 
exports.  
Further, this study examines the role of different exchange rate regimes in absorbing 
external shocks to the economies. We hypothesize that a fixed exchange rate regime magnifies 
the commodity price shocks, which became obvious after the Argentine currency and debt 
crisis in 2001–2002 (Edwards and Yeyati 2005). Under the fixed exchange rate system, 
economic stability is delayed, awaiting adjustment of nominal wages, commodity prices, or an 
increase in volatility of output and employment.2 As a result, it is assumed that commodity 
price volatility increases external debt under a fixed exchange rate regime. In contrast, a 
floating exchange rate regime may support the economic stability of a country by responding 
to commodity price shocks through exchange rate adjustments. In this study, we include a 
further classification, i.e. managed floating exchange rate regimes, where currencies can move 
within predetermined limits. The different classification of exchange rate regimes are obtained 
from Reinhart, Ilzetzki and Rogoff (2009). 
There is considerable literature on the relationship between the macroeconomy and 
commodity price volatility, but lack of information about commodity price volatility and 
external debt. This study aims to undertake an empirical analysis of the relationship between 
commodity price volatility and external debt along with the commodity price changes by 
 
1  Jacks, O’Rourke and Williamson (2011) show that since 1960, Latin American, South Asian, and African 
primary commodity exporting countries face three times higher volatility in the terms of trade than manufacturing-
exporting industrial economies.  
2 Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the domestic currency is fixed to another currency or a basket of currencies. 
Whereas under a floating exchange rate regime, the nominal exchange rate is allowed to move freely in response 
to supply and demand conditions in the foreign exchange market. 
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exploring the following research questions: How does commodity price volatility affect 
external debt accumulation? Are these effects different for commodity-exporting and 
commodity-importing countries? Does the exchange rate regime matter for government debt 
accumulation? 
This study fills the gap on two strands of the existing literature. First, the study is linked 
to the literature on the nexus between commodity prices and external debt, which generally 
shows a negative relationship for commodity-exporting countries [see e.g., Swaray (2005), 
Hausmann and Gavin (1995), and Olukoshi (1989)].3  Second, the study is related to the 
literature on exchange rate regimes. The argument favours the floating exchange rate regimes 
established by Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1961), which state that floating exchange rates 
can better absorb external shocks than fixed exchange rates. The reason being floating 
exchange rates allow faster adjustment of relative prices and quantities. Dąbrowski and 
Wroblewska (2016), Hoffmann (2007), Edwards and Yeyati (2005), Ghosh et al. (1997), Flood 
and Rose (1995), and Baxter and Stockman (1989) empirically find that floating exchange rates 
can absorb external shocks faster than fixed exchange rates. In contrast, Masson, Goldstein and  
Frenkel (1991), Aghevli, Khan and Montiel (1991) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) argue that 
a fixed exchange rate provides more fiscal discipline in light of the lax fiscal policies in 
developing countries.  
We first estimate the impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance for all 97 
countries (see Table A1 for the list of countries included in this study). These countries are 
then divided into two subgroups—commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
to examine how the impact of commodity price volatility differs according to the level of 
commodity endowments (see Table A2). 
 




The results of this study are novel, showing that there is a positive relationship between 
commodity price volatility and external debt: external debt increases with commodity price 
volatility in the full sample and for the commodity-exporting countries. We do not find any 
statistically significant impact of commodity price volatility on external debt in commodity-
importing countries. Further, our empirical results show that commodity price volatility has no 
statistically significant impact on external debt in countries that operate under floating 
exchange rate regimes.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. In Section 3, we 
describe the movements in commodity price volatility and external debt. In Section 4, we 
present the theory of the nexus between external shocks and exchange rate regimes. The 
methodology of this study is described in Section 5. We then describe the data and variables in 
Section 6 and Section 7 presents the empirical results from panel data estimation. Finally, 
Section 8 provides a conclusion and offers directions for future study. 
 
2. Literature review 
Lopez-Martin, Leal and Fritscher (2017), Arezki and Brückner (2012), Kamola (2007), Swaray 
(2005), among others, find a negative relationship between commodity price changes and 
government external debt, indicating that external debt decreases with increased commodity 
prices and vice-versa. The government can repay a portion of its debt with the extra revenue 
accrued from the commodity windfalls. Conversely, Nooruddin (2008) finds that government 
debt burden increases with commodity price booms. This is due to the increase in government 




Another reason is that rapid commodity price increases encourage corrupt and rent-
seeking behaviour and exacerbate societal tensions when the distribution of commodity 
revenues is not considered equitable (Ndikumana & Boyce 2000, and Ajayi 1991).4 Further, 
the higher volatility in revenues reduces the time horizons of policy actors who feel compelled 
to spend revenues when they are available. Overall, these various effects of revenue volatility 
result in rising fiscal deficits, the financing for which governments obtain through external 
borrowing (Edo 2002). These studies only focused on the impact of commodity price on 
external debt and no attention was given to commodity price volatility.  
Some of the current literature documents the reaction of public debt positions to the 
output cycle rather than in direct response to commodity price cycles (i.e., only indirectly 
linking commodity price fluctuations with external debt accumulation), linking the impact of 
commodity prices only through their possible effect on GDP. According to Giles and Paret 
(2018), Bittencourt (2015), Forslund, Lima and Panizza (2011), and Barro (1979) there is a 
countercyclical relationship between output cycles and public debt, indicating that public debt 
decreases with the rise of national income. However, these studies do not focus on the direct 
impact of commodity price cycles on government debt policy. While the effect of commodity 
prices on government external debt policies has been studied in the literature, there is a lack of 
analysis of the impact of commodity price volatility on government debt policies.  
 
3. Commodity price volatility and external debt 
In this section, we discuss the movement of commodity price volatility and external debt over 
time. In Figure 1, the primary axis, left-hand side (LHS), represents the value of average 
 
4In public choice theory and economics, rent-seeking involves aiming to increase one’s share of existing wealth 
without creating new wealth. Rent-seeking results in reduced economic efficiency through poor allocation of 
resources, reduced actual wealth-creation and lost government revenue.  
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external debt as a percentage of GNI for all 97 countries in the sample, commodity-exporters, 
and commodity-importing countries. On the secondary axis, right-hand side (RHS), we present 
the measure of commodity price volatility. From the Figure 1, it is observed that from the early-
1990s to the mid–2000s, commodity price volatility was low, reflecting the period referred to 
as the ‘Great Moderation’.5 In 2007–2009 (i.e., during the GFC), a big spike was observed in 
commodity price volatility. The period after 2009 shows greater volatility than the pre-GFC 
periods.  
The LHS of Figure 1 presents the trend of external debt for the three-country groups, 
all of which have a similar trend, though the external debt is higher in commodity-exporting 
countries.6 We also observe that during the 1980s, external debt increased continuously. The 
period of high debt in the 1980s is known as the ‘Washinton Consensus’: countries were under 
pressure to implement major policy reforms, such as opening their economies to increased trade, 
privatizing state-owned firms, and seeking foreign investment. The reforms were often 
imposed on developing countries as a condition for debt relief and financial support from 
Washington DC-based institutions, namely, the United States Treasury, the IMF, and the WB. 
A striking feature of Figure 1 shows that during the Great Moderation period (low 
commodity price volatility), the external debt declines substantially, particularly in 
commodity-exporting countries. After 2008, commodity price volatility increases in line with 
external debt increases. 
 
 
5 The term ‘Great Moderation’ refers to a reduction in the volatility of business cycle fluctuations starting in the 
mid–1980s. Bernanke (2004) hypothesise three potential causes for this economic stability: structural change in 
the economy, improved economic policy and good luck. 
6 We use the average of external debt data in Figure 1.  
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4. Theoretical background 
The impact of external shocks under different exchange rate regimes can be analysed by the 
movement of investment-savings (IS) curves that describe how the goods and money markets 
interact to balance the economy’s interest rate and output. In this section, we explain a possible 
channel in which the impact of commodity price volatility affects external debt using the 
standard IS curve under a fixed exchange rate and floating exchange rate regimes.  
4.1. Commodity price volatility shocks in commodity-exporting countries under the 
floating and fixed exchange rate regimes 
Figure 2a shows the effects of commodity price volatility under a floating exchange 
rate regime. Starting from the initial equilibrium at point A, where the initial output is Y0. 
Commodity price volatility decreases investment due to macroeconomic uncertainty.7 As a 
result, the initial IS0 curve shifts to the left (IS2). The new equilibrium point is B, where the 
output is Y1, which is lower than the previous output level at point A (Y0). At point B, the 
interest rate falls below the world interest rate, causing capital outflow, leading to the 
depreciation of the currency under the floating exchange rate regime. As the currency 
depreciates, export expands and import falls, causing output to rise again and the IS curve shifts 
towards its new equilibrium point at C. Therefore, floating exchange rate helps to stabilise the 
economy leading to higher outputs and eventually improve the fiscal position due to the 
automatic fiscal stabilizer.  
Figure 2b shows the effects of commodity price volatility in the economy under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. The initial equilibrium point is A, where the country’s equilibrium 
output is Y0. The commodity price volatility causes decrease in investment and output in 
commodity-exporting countries due rising uncertainty. Therefore, the IS0 curve shifts to the 
 
7 Note that commodity price volatility in a commodity exporting country may lead to uncertainty for investors in 
all sectors related to commodities. 
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left as IS1. The new equilibrium point is B, where the output is Y1, which is lower than the 
previous equilibrium point A (Y0). Under the fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank is 
forced to purchase the domestic currency to keep its value of the currency unchanged. As a 
result, the domestic money supply decreases. This monetary contraction results in a further 
decrease in output. Figures 2a and 2b explain why commodity price volatility increases external 
debt more under a fixed exchange rate regime compared to floating exchange rate regime. In 
Figure 3, we show the flowchart of this theoretical explanation.  
 
5. Methodology 
To explore the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt, we estimate Equation 1 
using the following dynamic panel data estimation models: (i) pooled ordinary least square 
(pooled OLS); (ii) fixed-effect (FE), and (iii) random effect (RE) models, which are commonly 
used in the literature. To select the appropriate model, we use the Hausman test. The Hausman 
test, favour the FE model as our baseline model and thus it is described in this section. Results 
for the Hausman test are presented in Table A 6 in Appendix A. 
5.1. The benchmark model 
Our benchmark model captures all effects that are specific to a country and that they do not 
vary over time (fixed effect), meaning that the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
when it remains constant over time and is correlated with all dependent and independent 
variables. We estimate the following model:  
 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                          (1) 
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where  𝛽0𝑖  is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect. 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is the 
percentage change in external debt as percentage of gross national income (GNI); 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 
represents the lag of the independent variable; 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 indicates the commodity price volatility, 
while 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡  represents the percentage change in commodity prices. 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represent the real interest rate (annual %), foreign direct investment (% of GDP), current 
account balance (% of GDP), and GDP per capita growth (annual %) respectively. A detailed 
description of the variables is presented in Table A3 in Appendix A. 
The subscripts i and t denote the specific country and period, respectively. The 
idiosyncratic disturbance term is denoted by Ɛ𝑖,𝑡.  
 
6. Data and description of the variables 
6.1. The data 
This study employs an unbalanced panel data dataset for 97. The frequency of the data is annual, 
covering the period from 1993 to 2016. The countries and periods included are based on data 
availability. The data for external debt, foreign direct investment, real interest rate, current 
account balance, and GDP per capita growth are collected from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of the WB.  
The data for commodity prices is from the IMF primary commodity price sheet. We 
convert the data into the annual form by taking the average of monthly data. Commodity prices 
are expressed as an index using the year 2005 as a base price. We estimate commodity price 
volatility from the commodity price index using the standard deviation from monthly data to 
capture monthly price variation. Formally, we estimate commodity price volatility as: 
                                                               𝜎𝑡  = √∑ (𝑃𝜏− 𝜇𝑡)212−112𝜏=1                                                  (2) 
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where, σt = commodity prices volatility at time t, Pτ = commodity monthly prices, µ t = average 
price (𝜇𝑡= (1/12) ∑ 𝑃𝜏12𝜏=1 ), and τ = months (1, 2, 3 … 12)     
6.2. Descriptive statistics, unit root test, and Hausman test  
Table A4 presents descriptive statistics. There is a significant difference between the maximum 
and minimum values of the commodity price volatility i.e. 36.65 and 0.91, respectively. The 
standard deviation of commodity price volatility is 7.8 indicating that there is a large dispersion 
from its mean value (8.50).  
In Table A5, we use the Augmented Ducky-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
tests to evaluate the stationary properties of all variables. Except for external debt and 
commodity prices, all variables included in the model are stationary. The ρ-values of external 
debt and commodity prices are > 0.05, indicating that these two series are not stationary. To 
make these series stationary, we use the percentage change of these two series.  
Table A6 shows that the p-value of the Hausman test is less than 5%, indicating that we 
can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that the FE model is 
appropriate, this result is consistent for all three country groups.  
 
7. Empirical results 
In this section, we describe the estimated coefficients for all countries in the sample, and those 
of commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries estimated with the FE model. 
The result of the Hausman test indicates that the FE model is the most appropriate choice for 
this study.8 In the sub-section 7.1, we discuss results for different country groups (full sample, 
commodity-exporting, and commodity-importing countries) reported in Tables 1 and 2, and in 
 
8 Description of pooled OLS and RE are presented in Appendix B. 
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sub-section 7.2. we discuss results for different country groups with alternative exchange rate 
regimes reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Finally, in sub-section 7.3 we discuss results for the 
robustness analysis reported in Table 6. 
7.1. Results for different country groups (full sample, commodity-exporting, and 
commodity-importing countries) 
Table 1 shows the results for the 97 countries (full sample). Columns 1, 2, and 3 estimates the 
pooled OLS, FE, and RE regression models, respectively.9 The coefficient of the commodity 
price volatility is positive (0.17, see column 2), indicating that change in external debt increases 
with commodity price volatility in all countries in the sample. All things being equal, a one 
standard deviation increase in commodity price volatility, leads to a 0.17 unit growth in 
external debt as a percentage of GNI. The negative coefficient of commodity price changes (–
0.24, see column 2) indicates that growth in external debt falls with the increase in commodity 
prices. A one-unit increase in commodity prices is associated with a significant decrease in the 
change in external debt by 0.24 units. The results are consistent across all three-panel data 
estimation models and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Table 2 shows the effects of commodity price volatility in the growth of external debt 
in commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries. The coefficient of the 
commodity price volatility is positive (0.32) for commodity-exporting countries’ (higher than 
the full sample) meaning that commodity price volatility has a larger effect on commodity 
exporters’ external debt accumulation (see column 2 in Table 2). This is likely because in 
commodity-exporting countries, commodity-linked fiscal revenues constitute a significant 
share of the government’s revenues. Conversely, commodity price volatility does not show any 
 
9 Note that to conserve space in this section, we only discuss the coefficient of the variables of interest: commodity 




statistically significant impact on external debt in commodity-importing countries (see columns 
4, 5, and 6). Our result is consistent with the view of Cavalcanti, Mohaddes and Raissi (2012) 
that commodity-importing countries have highly diversified commodity export and import 
baskets. Thus, these countries are not fully dependent on commodity revenues, and volatility 
in commodity prices has less or no effect on those countries compared to commodity-exporting 
countries.  
Table 2 also shows a negative nexus between change in commodity prices and growth 
in external debt, indicating that external debt accumulation significantly decreases with 
increases in commodity prices in commodity-exporting countries (see columns 1, 2, and 3). 
Such evidence suggests that exporting countries may repay their external loans by windfall 
revenues from commodity price booms. This result is supported by Swaray (2005), who finds 
a negative relationship between government debt and commodity prices in exporting countries.  
Our empirical results also show that external debt decreases with the increase in 
commodity prices in commodity-importing countries. One of the plausible reasons for this 
negative link between commodity price changes and external debt is, importing countries 
collect revenue by imposing taxes on imported commodities. For example, in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the average oil import tax is 
51.3% per litre. 
7.2. Results for different country groups with alternative exchange rate regimes 
In this section, we discuss the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt with 
alternative exchange rate regimes, in line with the theoretical framework described in Section 4. 
In Table 3, we present the empirical results for the full sample, and we observe that the 
coefficient of commodity price volatility is statistically significant in both fixed exchange rate 
(column 1) and managed floating exchange rate regimes (column 2) though the impact is higher 
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in the case of fixed regime (0.34) compared to the managed floating regime (0.32). However, 
we do not find any statistically significant impact of commodity price volatility on external 
debt under a floating exchange rate regime. These empirical findings are consistent with the 
framework described in Section 4. 
Table 4 shows the results for the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt 
in commodity-exporting countries under three different exchange rate regimes. The coefficient 
of commodity price volatility is higher than the full sample (see Table 3) under both the fixed 
and managed floating exchange rate regimes, indicating that commodity-exporting countries 
are more sensitive to commodity price volatility under both regimes. Table 4 also shows that 
the coefficient of commodity price volatility is three times higher in a fixed exchange rate 
regime (1.21) compared with a managed floating exchange rate regime (0.37), while the results 
are statistically insignificant under a floating exchange rate regime. 
In Table 5, we present the role of alternative exchange rate regimes to examine the 
impact of commodity price volatility on external debt in commodity-importing countries. The 
empirical results show that commodity price volatility impact on external debt increases in the 
managed floating exchange rate regime. However, we do not find any statistically significant 
impact under a floating exchange rate regime or the fixed exchange rate regime. 
7.3. Robustness analysis  
In this section, we use the one-step system of General Method of Moments (system-GMM) 
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in the estimation that 
addresses the possible endogeneity problem in the model. Table 6 shows the results of the 
estimation of Equation (1) using a one-step system GMM. Results show that the coefficients 
of commodity price volatility are 0.17, 0.34 and 0.06 in the full sample, commodity-exporting 
and commodity-importing countries, respectively which are similar with our baseline model. 
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The coefficients of other variables are not significantly altered by the one-step system GMM 
model from the findings estimated by the benchmark FE model.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This study aimed to explore the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt. Using 
dynamic panel data models for 97 countries for the period from 1993 to 2016, we found that 
external debt increases with commodity price volatility. Our empirical findings show that 
commodity price volatility has a significant adverse effect on external debt in the full sample 
and for commodity-exporting countries. However, we do not find any statistically significant 
impact on commodity-importing countries.  
This study also examines the impact of commodity price volatility in three different 
exchange rate regimes: fixed, managed floating, and freely floating. Once the exchange rate is 
freely determined by the market (floating exchange rate), the impact of commodity price 
volatility on external debt is statistically insignificant. When the exchange rate is completely 
fixed, compared to a managed floating exchange rate, the impact is three times higher in 
commodity-exporting countries. These results have important monetary policy implications, as 
our results indicate that the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime is critical to reduce the 
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Table 1: Determinants of the external debt (full sample) 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 






























































R2 0.12 0.21 0.12 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.16 0.12 
Periods  24 24 24 
Countries 97 97 97 
Observations 1653 1653 1653 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, **, and 
* indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in 











Table 2: Determinants of the external debt (commodity-exporting and importing countries) 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
 Commodity-exporting countries Commodity-importing countries 



































































































































R2 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.24 0.12 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.12 
Periods 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Countries 41 41 41 56 56 56 
Observations 698 698 698 955 955 955 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, **, and 











Table 3: Determinants of the external debt in the full sample (based on exchange rate regimes) 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
 Fixed exchange rate 
(1) 
Managed floating exchange rate 
 (2) 
Floating exchange rate 

























































R2 0.20 0.28 0.71 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.20 0.56 
Periods  18 18 18 
Countries 31 67 27 
Observations 281 743 100 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, **, and 
* indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in 











Table 4: Determinants of external debt in commodity-exporting countries 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡  
 Fixed exchange rate 
(1) 
Managed floating exchange rate 
 (2) 
Floating exchange rate 

























































R2 0.24 0.27 0.90 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.19 0.74 
Periods  18 18 15 
Countries  14 30 12 
Observations 111 350 30 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, **, and 












Table 5: Determinants of external debt in commodity-importing countries 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡  
 Fixed exchange rate 
(1) 
Managed floating exchange rate 
 (2) 
Floating exchange rate 

























































R2 0.31 0.28 0.50 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.19 0.19 
Periods  18 18 18 
Countries  17 37 15 
Observations 170 393 70 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, **, and 




Table 6: Determinants of external debt with the system-GMM method 











































AR (1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 









Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, **, and 
* indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Φ indicates the significance at the 20% 
level. 
Figure 1: Movement of commodity price volatility and external debt 
 
















































Full sample (LRS) Commodity-exporting countries (LHS)






Figure 2a. Shocks with floating exchange 
rate 
Figure 2b. Shocks with fixed exchange rate 
 
 
Figure 3: Commodity price volatility and external debt  
a. Under a floating exchange rate regime 
 



















































Table A 1: List of countries (n =97) 
Afghanistan Congo, Rep. Liberia Rwanda 
Albania Costa Rica Macedonia, North Samoa 
Angola Cote d’Ivoire Malawi Sao Tome 
Argentina Dominica Malaysia Senegal 
Armenia Dominican Republic Maldives Sierra Leone 
Azerbaijan Egypt, Arab Rep. Mali Solomon Islands 
Bangladesh El Salvador Mauritius South Africa 
Belarus Fiji Mexico Sri Lanka 
Belize Gabon Moldova St. Lucia 
Benin The Gambia Mongolia St. Vincent 
Bhutan Georgia Montenegro Syrian Arab Rep. 
Bolivia  Grenada Morocco Tajikistan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala Mozambique Tanzania 
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Myanmar Thailand 
Brazil Guyana Nepal Togo 
Burkina Faso Haiti Nicaragua Tonga 
Burundi Honduras Nigeria Uganda 
Cabo Verde India Pakistan Ukraine 
Cameroon Indonesia Panama Vanuatu 
Central African Rep. Jamaica Papua New Guinea Venezuela 
Chad Jordan Paraguay Vietnam 
China Kenya Peru Zambia 
Colombia Kyrgyz Republic Philippines  
Comoros Lebanon Romania  
Congo, Dem. Lesotho Russian Federation  











Table A 2: List of commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
Commodity-exporting countries (n = 41) Commodity-importing countries (n = 56) 
Argentina Paraguay Afghanistan Lesotho 
Armenia Peru Albania Liberia 
Benin Russia Angola Macedonia, North 
Bolivia Rwanda Azerbaijan Malaysia 
Botswana Senegal Bangladesh Maldives 
Burundi Sierra Belarus Mauritius 
Cameroon Syria Belize Mexico 
Central African Rep. Tajikistan Bhutan Mongolia 
Colombia Tanzania Bosnia Montenegro 
Congo, Rep. Togo Brazil Morocco 
Cote d’Ivoire Uganda Burkina Faso Myanmar 
Egypt Venezuela Cabo Verde Nepal 
Fiji Zambia Chad Nigeria 
Gabon  China Pakistan 
The Gambia  Comoros Philippines 
Guatemala  Congo, Dem. Romania 
Guyana  Costa Rica Samoa 
Honduras  Dominica Sao Tome 
Indonesia  Dominican Rep. Solomon Islands 
Kenya  El Salvador South Africa 
Kyrgyz Republic  Georgia Sri Lanka 
Malawi  Grenada St. Lucia 
Mali  Guinea-Bissau St. Vincent 
Moldova  Haiti Thailand 
Mozambique  India Tonga 
Nicaragua  Jamaica Ukraine 
Panama  Jordan Vanuatu 












Table A 3: Description of the variables 
Variables Mnemonic Description Source 
Dependent variable      
External debt (% of 
GNI) 
𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 Total external debt stocks to gross national income is 
a debt owed to non-residents repayable in currency, 
goods, or services.  
WDI, WB 
Control variables      
Commodity prices 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 All commodity price index using 2005=100, 






𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 Use standard deviation to estimate volatility.  Author’s 
calculation 
Real interest rate (%) 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 The real interest rate is the lending interest rate 





inflows (% of GDP) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Foreign direct investment is the net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management interest 
in an enterprise operating in an economy.  
WDI, WB 
Current account 
balance (% of GDP)  
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 The current account balance is the sum of net exports 
of goods and services, net primary income, and net 
secondary income. 
WDI, WB 
GDP per capita 
growth (annual %) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars.  
WDI, WB 
Exchange rate regimes  
Natural regime 
classification 
 i. Fixed exchange rate regimes: No separate legal 
tender, and currency board arrangements. Dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the country uses 
fine classification 1-2 and 0 otherwise. 
ii. Managed floating regimes: Limited flexibility 
regimes Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 
if the country uses fine classification 3-12 and 0 
otherwise. 
iii. Floating exchange rate regimes: Freely 
floating, and freely falling. Dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if the country uses fine 





Note: To ensure stationarity, we use percentage change in external debt and commodity price series and they 
expressed as 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 respectively in equation (1). 
 
Change in external debt (𝑷𝑪𝑬𝑫𝒊,𝒕): Change in external debt is our dependent variable 
and is denoted by 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 in the model. We use debt as a measure of fiscal policy because it 
is a broader measurement of government fiscal activities than the budget deficit. The 
commonly reported measures of financial balance overstate the economically relevant deficit 
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by including the inflation component of interest payments on the government debt. It would be 
more appropriate, however, if the interest component of government debt were treated as a type 
of debt repayment rather than as an item of current budgetary expenditure. The change in 
government debt automatically adjusts this component (Roubini & Sachs 1989). 
Lagged change in external debt (𝑷𝑪𝑬𝑫𝒊,𝒕−𝟏): We include the lagged value of external 
debt as an influencing variable to correct for past budgetary imbalances. A significant change 
in fiscal policy in the past may induce governments to undo part of the recent increases. 
Changes in the government debt may also result from lags or delays in effecting budgetary 
initiatives, for example, previous fiscal policy decisions, such as the implementation of tax 
reforms and significant spending reforms, can affect public finances in the following years.  
Change in commodity prices (𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑷𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that external debt will decrease 
with the increase in commodity prices and vice-versa. Governments can repay the debt by using 
extra revenue accrued from the commodity price windfall, especially in the commodity-
exporting countries. The commodity importing country’s government debt is also influenced 
by commodity prices through import tax. In both groups of countries, government external debt 
will decrease with the increase in commodity prices. 
Commodity price volatility(𝑪𝑷𝑽𝒊,𝒕): Generally, primary commodity prices are more 
volatile than the prices of manufacturing goods. Following the recent global financial crisis 
(GFC) in 2007-2009, commodity price volatility increased, considerably (Omojolaibi & 
Egwaikhide 2014). Because of this volatility, government revenue tends to be more volatile – 
along with government spending. The uncertainty of future revenue from commodities and the 
variability of those revenues results in changes in the expenses as the government reassesses 
its expected revenue stream, generating significant adjustment costs. In these circumstances, 
governments try to borrow from external sources to smooth out the level of economic activities. 
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As a result, it can generally be expected that commodity price volatility will increase 
government external debt.  
Real interest rate (𝑹𝑰𝑹𝒊,𝒕): The interest rate is the price a borrower pays for the use of 
the money they borrow from a lender/financial institution or the fee paid on borrowed assets 
(Crowley 2007). It is expected that external debt increases with an increase in real interest rates 
because more money is needed to pay to the lenders.  
Foreign direct investment ( 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊,𝒕) : It is expected that an increase in FDI rate 
promotes economic growth that helps to reduce external debt accumulation. According to 
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998), FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of 
technologies, knowledge, and human capital, all associated with higher productivity and 
eventually decrease external debt.  
Current account balance (𝑪𝑨𝑩𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that the current account balance has 
a negative impact on external debt accumulation. If a country’s balance increases, indicating 
that its exports are more than imports. This encourages investment and output growth causing 
lower external debt and vice-versa. Mehta and Kayumi (2014) show there is a negative 
relationship between current account balance and external debt in India.  
Gross domestic product (𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that external debt decreases with the 
increase in GDP per capita. This is because with the higher per capita income, people will pay 
more taxes which increase the government’s tax revenue and also decreases the government's 






Table A4: Descriptive statistics  
 𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 Mean 61.02 0.92 8.50 111.68 4.73 7.38 4.82 −5.46 2.69 
 Median 43.71 −1.44 6.51 111.25 4.52 7.17 3.26 −4.31 2.62 
 Maximum 1252.42 300.07 36.65 192.57 27.80 77.61 84.94 43.39 33.03 
 Minimum 3.89 −80.42 0.91 47.72 −35.27 −98.15 −37.16 −80.05 −22.55 
 Std. Dev. 72.11 25.19 7.82 50.16 18.19 11.26 6.26 10.20 4.25 
 Skewness 7.52 3.90 2.29 0.26 −0.50 −1.29 3.73 −0.95 0.20 
 Kurtosis 93.02 39.26 8.70 1.58 2.47 18.04 31.87 7.90 9.00 
Observations 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 
 
Table A5: Unit root test 
 Augmented Ducky–Fuller (ADF)            Phillips–Peron (PP) 
 Statistics p-value Statistics P-value 𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 196.06 0.44 214.00 0.15 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 850.77 0.00 2898.31 0.00 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 336.65 0.00 493.34 0.00 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 101.60 1.00 92.71 1.00 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 460.99 0.00 980.37 0.00 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 576.98 0.00 1063.64 0.00 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 387.56 0.00 524.20 0.00 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 383.38 0.00 391.70 0.00 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 962.23 0.00 1076.96 0.00 
Note: 𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = Externa debt, 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = Percentage change in external debt, 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡= Commodity price volatility, 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡= Commodity prices, 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = Percentage change in commodity prices, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =Real interest rate, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 
Foreign direct investment, and 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =  Current account balance, and  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = GDP per capita growth. 
 
Table A6: Results of the Hausman test 
Null hypothesis: RE model is appropriate 
Country groups  Chi-Sq. Statistics p-value 
 
Comments 
Full Sample 149.29 0.00 
 
Reject Null hypothesis 
Commodity-exporting 
countries 
49.84 0.00 Reject Null hypothesis 
Commodity-importing 
countries 






A 2.1. Pooled OLS model 
In the pooled OLS models, we have pooled all the observations in OLS regression meaning 
that implicitly we assume the coefficient is the same for all the individuals. So, we can write 
the model (1) by the following form – 
𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                     (3)                              
A 2.2. Random effect (RE) models 
In the RE, the variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the 
independent variables included in the model. The rationale behind the random effect models is 
that, unlike the fixed effect models, the variation across entities is assumed to be random and 
uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the model. The random-
effects model includes all fixed effect assumptions plus the additional requirement that (Ϙ𝑖) is 
independent of all explanatory variables in all periods. Hence, the variability of the constant 
for each section comes from:  
                                                     𝛽0𝑖  =  𝛽0 +  Ϙ𝑖                                                                       (4) 
Where Ϙ𝑖  is a zero-mean standard random variable. Therefore equation (3) with random 
effects takes the following form-  
𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +Ϙ𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                             (5)                                                                              
We estimate equation (3) and (5) for all country groups mentioned above. 
 
